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In his extensive exploration of the various cultural instantiations of monstrosity, Stephen 
Asma dedicates a chapter, appropriately titled “Inner Monsters,” to the monster of the 
Enlightenment era.  Acquiring a psychological attention by critics, the literary monster within 
this framework is portrayed as a “product of human superstition that can be conquered by the 
light of reason” (Asma 202).  Constructed for the purpose of warning against repressed desires 
that are viewed as negative by social or moral codes, the monster consequently adopts the status 
of the Other.  However, undoubtedly influenced by Freud’s simultaneous development of 
psychoanalytic theory, the modern monster is utilized in fiction not only to distance socially but 
also to explore these repressed characteristics.  Therefore, the fictional monster accrues a 
similitude toward reader in order that readers might empathize with figures of simultaneous 
horror.   
While this subversive technique appears to dismantle social categorization, it effectively 
reinforces this process in its dependence upon reader internalization of binary categories.  
Indeed, this sociological implication is afforded little scholarly attention in the shadows of the 
more popular psychoanalytic perspective.  However, as Asma asserts, “monsters after [sin] Freud 
are features of the irrevocable irrationality inside the human subject and outside in nature” (202).  
With the addition of this attention to the external—rather than solely internal—implications of 
monstrosity, there necessitates a simultaneous sociological consideration.  Within Gothic fiction, 
Samuel Beckett initiates this sociological investigation of reader and monster (subject and 
object) by destabilizing this oppositional relationship.  Contemporary writers Bret Easton Ellis 
and Chuck Palahniuk adopt this deconstructive attitude in order to express monstrosity in a way 
that is both psychologically subversive and socially transgressive.  While Ellis universalizes 
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monstrosity in an effort to undermine social confinement of the Other, Palahniuk incorporates an 
ontological perspective based on radical flux.  In a world of infinite play between signifier 
(subject) and signified (object), marginalization of the monster is impossible.  “There is no grand 
narrative, no universal human nature, no objective reality, no Enlightenment truth to be captured 
by reason,” (252).  
Therefore, these writers’ works embody a monstrosity derived from a functional versus 
definitive basis.  Asma explains that “in earlier theories, from Aristotle to logical positivism, we 
assumed that every instances of bird or bed or monster must satisfy an abstract essential 
definition [. . .] Wittgenstein, however, noticed that most things were not connected by a 
common definition, but instead share overlapping similarities” (282).  He further asserts that this 
mode of thinking about categorization has acquired the label of prototype theory.  Similarly, the 
monstrosity that this thesis attributes to the fiction of Beckett, Ellis, and Palahniuk is conceived 
not as an intrinsic characteristic of the main protagonist but rather as a functional conformity to 
archetypal monsters that threaten binary boundaries, exacerbate unease, and compel readers.  In 
Invisible Monsters, Palahniuk utilizes the archetypes within preceding Gothic discourse as a tool 
for deconstructing the confined territory in which the monster resides.  In this way, his 











Section I: Development of Gothic Discourse 
 
In the introduction to a collection of essays titled Gothic and Modernism, John Paul 
Riquelme attributes the development of Gothic writing as a discourse of modernity primarily to 
two texts: Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891) and Stoker’s Dracula (1897).  These 
works, being heavily influenced by Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
(1886), provide models for representing cultural and anthropological concerns regarding 
difference via literary forms that are self-cognizant in terms of structure (Riquelme 5).  A 
particular development of early modernity that indicates this self-cognizance is structural 
doubling, whereby the form of a text mirrors the dual nature of character identity.  Form 
functions on both a literal level (fulfilling its narrative purpose) and a metaphorical level 
(fulfilling its subversively psychological purpose).   By positioning seemingly similar objects in 
opposition toward one another or, inversely, seemingly dissimilar objects parallel to one another, 
writers who employ this technique exacerbate unease in readers by exposing either the validity of 
their intuitive beliefs or the invalidity of their empirically-based beliefs.  This psychoanalytic 
strategy is particularly useful in exposing social and psychological conventions, for its 
subversive impact on readers temporarily displaces reader from self.  The result of this 
displacement is a destabilization of reader subjectivity and an introspective objectivity with 
which reader might examine self through a third-party lens, i.e. that of the morally transgressive 
protagonist.  Furthermore, this reversal of reader position from subject (watching) to object (self-
watching) suspends ethical binaries that otherwise might limit their capacity to identify with the 
deviant protagonist.  In this way, structural doubling complicates the expression of monstrosity 
in modern Gothic narrative as it transforms the monster as distinctively Other into a subjective 
tool for psychological exploration.   
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As a result of this internalization of the monster during modernity, reader response 
accrues an emphasis on intellectual engagement alongside the previous high emotionalism of the 
Gothic.  Seeking to understand that which they fear and the source of this fear, readers seek this 
intellectual engagement as a means of questioning, re-affirming, or denying moral values or 
social codes. Stephen T. Asma explains that “our ethical convictions do not spring fully grown 
from our heads but must be developed in the context of real and imagined challenges.  In order to 
discover our values, we have to face trials and tribulation, and monsters help us imaginatively 
rehearse” (Asma 3).  By this definition, there must be an Othered figure that is constituted by 
negative societal values with which to reaffirm or deny positive values, and anthropomorphized 
monstrosity remedies this predicament. 
This observation reveals an essential tension that must exist for sustenance of the monster 
as Other within texts employing such convention—order, rationality, form, and idealism must 
contrast disorder, fragmentation, the marginal, and the unconscious.  Furthermore, readers must 
accept and internalize such a binary logic in order to rehearse effectively with an Othered figure.  
In Aggressive Fictions: Reading the Contemporary American Novel, Kathryn Hume claims that 
the grotesque Other is the direct result of a disruption of balance between these polarized 
categories.  She contends that the Grotesque “may be a hybrid of the two; it may operate by 
reversing the poles; it may be neither-nor; it may represent a third option in its own right.  
Somehow, though, it emerges in the gap between the poles” (Hume 79).  This relocation of the 
monster into an ambiguous category of existence is typical of late modernity/early postmodernity 
and is an attempt to weaken even further the monster/reader dichotomy.  A particularly 
deconstructive approach, it is comparable to feminist Elizabeth LeBlanc’s predication of an 
ambiguous gender category, that of the “metaphorical lesbian.” She explains that “the 
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metaphorical lesbian recognizes those limitations [of patriarchal binary discourse] and resists 
them, searching until her final moments for an alternative way of speaking.  That resistance in 
itself provides a kind of self-definition that underlines [the metaphorical lesbian’s] consistent use 
of ‘otherness’” (LeBlanc 244).   While these constructions of ambiguity appear to offer their 
marginalized figures an escape from the patriarchal system of binary logic—“the monster is that 
which escapes sole confinement in one of these categories”—, both Hume and LeBlanc 
ironically sustain the system.  That is, their creations of new centers of discourse (i.e. an 
ambiguous category) reinforce the necessity of binary boundaries with which to define the 
feminine and monstrous Others.  Nevertheless, the transitional attitude bordering late modernity 
and postmodernity contributes a complexity of expression that seeks to dissolve the hierarchical 
relationship between monster/reader and, consequently, form/content that later is extended by 
writers such as Bret Easton Ellis and, as this thesis will argue, most radically by Chuck 
Palahniuk.   
Graham Fraser discusses the effects of this transitional attitude on form and content in 
early postmodernity by appealing to a late novella of Beckett, titled Ill Seen, Ill Said.  The 
novella is representative of a style which he calls “Beckettian Gothic,” being “melancholy, 
unstable, self-consuming and self-haunting” (Fraser 178).  A work that is self-conscious of its 
employment of the Gothic tropes of being haunted by the Other and watching/seeing an objective 
Other, the text blurs “distinction between self and other, actuality and ghost” (Fraser 178).  
Fraser summarizes the basic situation of the work in the following way:  “A disembodied, 
hovering eye inspects a circular, barren landscape, following the movements of an immaterial 
old woman as she paces between the ramshackle cabin which is her ‘abode’ and a ‘distant tomb’ 
at the margins of the scene” (169).   He continues to discuss the self-reflexivity of the text by 
Blair 8 
 
addressing the opening pages, in which the narrator hints at a shared identity between the 
spectral eye and the main protagonist: “‘she shows herself only to her own.  But she has no own.  
Yes yes she has one.  And who has her’” (Beckett qtd. in Fraser 179).   Here, Fraser explains that 
in creating an ambiguity of identity concerning observer (the eye) and observed (the woman), 
Beckett denies readers the possibility of labeling an Other figure due to this lack of 
subject/object distinction.  Furthermore, Beckett does not distinguish whether the woman is alive 
or dead, existent or non-existent, body or spirit.  In denying these binary distinctions, he 
demonstrates an indeterminacy—“everything [is] spectral, there and not there, or in flux between 
these two states but never conclusively achieving either,”—that, likewise, denies the reader a 
stable perspective by which to judge an Other figure (Fraser 172). This ontological and narrative 
indeterminacy is particularly significant in terms of the Gothic because it demonstrates a 
deconstructive attitude toward the genre. Writers such as Palahniuk hone this self-disruptive 
technique within Gothic discourse to initiate a self-disruptive process whereby Gothic tropes, 
“stripp[ed] of much of the emotional, visceral energy that typifies Gothic literature,” not only 
deconstruct themselves but in doing so disorient readers (Fraser 170).  Furthermore, this attitude 
establishes a precedent for expressing monstrosity as an indeterminate process that is denied 
physical manifestation.  In the context of instability and immateriality, defining monstrosity in 
association with physical attributes is no longer possible.  The effect that this denial has on 
reader implication involves a stripping away of emotionalism and, instead, a disorienting and 
heavily intellectual engagement with narrative. 
 Whereas Beckett utilizes a “hauntological” approach toward denying monstrosity a 
physicality and, hence, destabilizing boundaries necessary for upholding an Othered category, 
postmodern fiction writer Brett Easton Ellis universalizes monstrosity (Fraser 170).  That is, he 
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takes a critical step in the development of monster discourse by granting an apparent 
manifestation of monstrosity in his protagonist Patrick Bateman while simultaneously utilizing 
this figure to assert that Bateman’s monstrosity is diffused throughout the consumerist society.  
Hence, he combines intellectual engagement of the topic with an emotionalism afforded by 
bodily manifestation of Otherness.  Ellis’s protagonist, whose social veneer aligns him alongside 
readers, is portrayed as an everyman who succumbs to “bestial urges,” a submission that 
indicates that this potential for monstrosity “[lies] dormant in all of us, and the only difference 
between us and Patrick is that he has indulged them” (Heyler 130).  Furthermore, like readers 
who identify with Ellis’s protagonist, Bateman recognizes that these urges cast him into a 
category of difference within his society.  Therefore, when he encounters various socially 
marginalized figures (e.g. women and homeless individuals), he perceives threat because these 
figures essentially function as mirrors for his own non-conforming position within society.  
Indeed, Bateman constantly seeks to subvert this Otherness by conforming, if not morally, then 
aesthetically to consumerist society—“I change into Ralph Lauren monogrammed boxer shorts 
and a Fair Isle sweater and slide into polka-dot Enrico Hidolin slippers,” he informs readers 
(Ellis 26).  The significance of this aesthetic conformity is that it allows Bateman to position 
himself alongside readers, a position which is necessary for his reader subversion.  By providing 
readers with a protagonist with whom they can identify on some level, Ellis effectively 
implicates readers in the transgressive deeds of his monstrous protagonist.  A particularly 
effective use of this technique occurs when Bateman feeds his girlfriend a “used urinal cake 
covered in cheap chocolate sauce but masquerading as a tempting delicacy in a Godiva box,” and 
recounts that she  
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looks like a big black ant—a big black ant in an original Christian Lacroix—eating a 
urinal cake and I almost start laughing [. . .] Even though I marveled at her eating the 
thing, [sin] I’m reminded that no matter how satisfying it was to see Evelyn eating 
something that I , and countless others, had pissed on, in the end the displeasure it caused 
her was at my expense—it’s an anticlimax, a futile excuse to put up with her for three 
hours. (Ellis 337) 
In this instance, readers are entertained by notably one of the least transgressive acts of the main 
protagonists.  Several factors contribute to their identification with the deviant protagonist rather 
than his unknowing, “normal” girlfriend—dramatic irony and Bateman’s matter-of-fact narration 
are two of these.  A more subtle element that situates readers within this scenario, however, is the 
coded consumerist language—Godiva, Christian Lacroix, etc.  
Another significant element, and perhaps the most distinctive contribution of Ellis toward 
continuation of the Gothic within postmodernity, is the parodic mode through which he reveals 
this ironic diffusion of monstrosity within consumerist culture.  This employment of parody 
functions as a continuation of the modernist precedent of structural doubling.  Ellis radicalizes 
the doubling effect in American Psycho as his protagonist, rather amusingly, is repeatedly 
mistaken to be other persons.  Furthermore, in a fulfillment of Ellis’s parodic attitude, Bateman 
responds as if he actually possessed these mistaken identities.  Throughout the novel, Bateman 
also confesses to his monstrous deeds, yet his societal peers humorously dismiss these 
confessions. Similarly, he explicitly recounts these deeds to readers—“I’m coming back from 
Central Park where, near the children’s zoo, close to the spot I murdered the McCaffrey boy, I 
fed portions of Ursula’s brain to passing dogs” (Ellis 384) While the content of this direct 
address is disturbing, readers dismiss this confession as merely characteristic of Bateman, 
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someone who is both Other and same.  Bateman’s peers, however, dismiss his confession 
because they cannot conceive of a monster that exists within their social circle. Heyler asserts 
that “the failure of others to recognize [Bateman] for what he is, despite his frequent confessions, 
assists him in creating his own version of reality, an apocalyptic reality that validates his 
priorities and perspective, one that questions the generally accepted version of ‘normal’” (141).  
By creating a character that does not fulfill public expectation of difference based upon 
appearance and other socially coded values, Ellis also utilizes parody as a means of undermining 
such categorization.  A monster that navigates between boundaries of excess and lack is 
unsuspected by a society encoded with such binary logic. 
 Palahniuk exercises a similar technique in Invisible Monsters, although his tone is more 
direct and bitingly satiric. Palahniuk’s protagonist, Shannon McFarland, openly expresses her 
frustration with the situation exemplified by Bateman’s confessions, i.e. a societal assumption 
that the monster is distant, Other-than, and physically abhorrent versus within society, self-same, 
and potentially hidden beneath a conforming appearance:  “They’d like me to sit here in the dark 
and pretend it’s the outside world we’re hiding from.  It’s some hateful stranger that’s going to 
come get us in the night.  It’s some alien fatal sex disease.  They’d like to think it’s some bigoted 
homophobe they’re terrified of” (Palahniuk 150-1).  Shannon is referring literally to her parents’ 
reaction toward their homosexual son, whom they assume to have AIDS due to his sexuality, as 
well as their imagined hate-criminals who harass them prominently via telephone threats.  
Similar to the humorous irony of Bateman’s situation, in which readers know the validity of his 
bestial confessions, readers of Invisible Monsters are able to acknowledge (less humorously) the 
irony of Shannon’s words because of her own physical deformity and transgressive deeds of 
which her parents are unaware. Readers also discover later that the harassing telephone calls are 
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from Shannon, herself, whom her parents believe to be away at a photo shoot in Cancún, 
Mexico.  This discovery extends an already satiric situation into a revelation that the perceived 
external threat lies, ironically, within a familiar context. 
The extent of Shannon’s parents’ judgmental as well as hypocritical attitude toward that 
which they do not understand is revealed on one occasion when a physically deformed and 
unintelligible Shannon calls her father.  Unable to comprehend Shannon’s jumbled language, her 
father hands the receiver to Shannon’s mother, who answers: “‘Hello? [. . .] There’s room in 
God’s heart for all His children.  Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered’” (Palahniuk 142).  
Next, Shannon overhears her father in the background: “‘you still talking to those lunatics?’” 
(142). Eventually, the conversation that, really, is one-sided, develops into Mr. McFarland 
roaring defensively, “You, you’re the one who should be dead…You killed my son, you 
goddamned perverts’” (Palahniuk 142).  In this instance, Palahniuk utilizes an irony that 
combines both a familiar situation with a more direct commentary, as revealed by Shannon’s 
description of her own social marginalization.  The effect of this repetition of indirect and direct 
social commentary is a self-cognizance that allows Palahniuk subtly to undermine the 
categorization of difference while developing an awareness in readers of their own recognition of 
this issue (the testimony to this awareness being their sympathy toward Shannon and their 
familiarity with the reaction of the McFarland parents).  One of several subversive techniques 
honed by Palahniuk in order to dissolve reader subjectivity, his satiric mode of expressing the 
hypocrisy (ergo, instability) of the gazing subject toward an Othered object allows him 
effectively to dissolve this oppressive relationship.  Furthermore, it is indicative of the 




Section II: Philosophy of “The Monster” 
 
Categorization of a monster figure in Gothic discourse relies upon two clusters of 
opposing values, one concerning rationality and form and the other concerning irrationality and 
chaos. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, Hume asserts the Grotesque arises within a third 
space that is “somehow enterable by both, in which the values transform each other, their 
interaction or merging causing the reader discomfort” (85).  Pertaining this system is a 
dichotomous as well as oppressive mode of thought which has its origins in the metaphysical 
dualism introduced by Plato during the 5
th
 Century BC.  A significant influence on Plato’s 
dualism is revealed by Aristotle in Metaphysics to be a Heraclitean-influenced philosopher from 
Plato’s youth named Cratylus, whose influence James Jordan describes in the following way: 
Cratylus [sin] taught [Plato] that the whole existence is in such radical flux that 
everything escapes our attempts to comprehend it.  Nothing remains the same or stands 
still long enough for us to say anything even approximately accurate about it.  Heraclitus 
had declared that you cannot step into the same river twice.  Cratylus insisted that you 
cannot step into it even once, so incessantly is everything changing in every respect. 
(Jordan 78-9) 
Jordan further asserts that Plato’s theory of forms arises in response to this extreme flux doctrine 
of Cratylus, a doctrine that denies the existence of “distinctive patterns or forms” and, hence, “no 
persons or things with definite characteristics in which they could resemble one another.  
General definitions as to what all virtuous persons and good things have in common would be 
out of the question” (Jordan 79).  Recognizing the oppositional nature of Cratylus’s flux doctrine 
and Plato’s idealism, one might assert a similar opposition between the literatures influenced by 
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each theory.  Indeed, as noted in Section I of this thesis, a culture that internalizes a logic based 
on Platonic idealism produces monster figures that contrast dramatically with those of a culture 
influenced by flux.  Furthermore, the monstrosity introduced by Palahniuk in Invisible Monsters 
has its roots in a radical strand of flux.  Compared with his postmodern contemporaries, he most 
effectively dissolves boundaries necessary for upholding monstrosity as Other by negating, like 
Cratylus, the possibility of general definitions concerning existence and identity.  An 
understanding of how Plato’s idealism contributes to an oppressive system of binary logic by 
asserting these definitions provides insight into the modern monster as an entity employing this 
logic.  Additionally, this prior understanding of idealism allows for a thorough comprehension of 
how deconstruction arises as a significant tool for postmodern Gothic writers, specifically for 
Palahniuk. 
In Phaedo, Plato establishes his theory of forms, which distinguishes between a world of 
forms and one of instantiations of those forms.  He explains that the forms are incorporeal, static 
entities—absolute unity, absolute beauty, etc.—and, as such, represent the highest form of order, 
the underlying principle of order for the universe.  Hence, forms, insomuch as they “possess full 
reality,”  are the ideal states to which all sensible things strive to “measure up, or resemble, or 
participate in” (Jordan 88).  Plato exemplifies this imitative relationship in Phaedo by addressing 
equality.  Paraphrasing Plato’s example, Jordan explains that “two sticks or stones, however 
equal they may at first seem in size or in weight, will be found to fall short of perfect equality.  
Perfect equality, like perfect straightness or squareness or circularity, never shows up in our 
experience.  The best we can expect is an approximation that is tolerably close” (87).  This 
theory is influenced by a teleological worldview, asserting that the purpose of all sensible things 
is “to be as perfect an instance of that kind of thing as it possibly can be” (Jordan 91).  This 
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teleological relationship between forms and their instantiations depends upon a hierarchy of 
being, and this association of being with perfection initiates a tradition of binary thinking that 
manifests itself in monster discourse.  Form/thing, reality/appearance, unity/plurality, 
perfection/imperfection, immortal/mortal, eternal/temporal, divine/human—these oppositions 
assert an oppressive system of categorization not only by establishing a logic of superiority 
versus inferiority of being, but also by unconsciously creating a third, ambiguous territory.  
Perhaps this is the space to which Kathryn Hume refers in her definition of the Grotesque—that 
which is a hybrid of the polarized categories or, perhaps more horrific, outside of both categories 
and inconceivable by the terms of established discourse.   
Jacques Derrida addresses the oppressive nature of Plato’s dualism, a system that he 
claims to be fundamental within the logocentric discourse of Western society. Furthermore, he 
asserts this oppressive nature in his definition of metaphysics:   
[Metaphysics denotes] the enterprise of returning ‘strategically,’ ‘ideally,’ to an origin or 
to a priority thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order 
then to think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All 
metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this 
way, conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before 
the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the 
imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among 
others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most 
profound and most potent. (Reynolds) 
According to Derrida, Western binary thought favors the simple, the good, and the imitated  
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at the expense of marginalized categories of the complex, the impure, and the inauthentic.  It is 
self-defeating merely to subvert these categories as a means of re-establishing power to the 
subordinate category, Derrida argues, for the superior category only would fill the position of 
inferiority, effectively reinstating the oppressive relationship. Rather, Derrida expresses the need 
for a displacement of the entire system of binary thought by dissolving such a system.  He coins 
the term deconstruction for this new perspective that denies absolute, definitive categories of 
existence and disrupts the concept of observer being entirely objective to object being observed 
(in this case, reader and text).  
 Given the prominence of binary thought within Western discourse, deconstructionist 
influence on social thought, particularly pertaining to minority populations, may come as no 
surprise.  For the purposes of this thesis, and given the unavoidable emphasis on gender, 
femininity, and sexuality within the Gothic genre, it is beneficial to examine the implications that 
Derrida’s attitude toward binary thought has held for feminist criticism.  An understanding of 
these implications within French feminism, in particular, is beneficial in considering Chuck 
Palahniuk’s transformation of the monstrosity in Invisible Monsters, a work in which dissolution 
of the oppressive binary system that formerly incarcerated the monster is of primary focus. 
 Derrida’s influence on French feminism is effectively conveyed in Hélène Cixous’s 
manifesto, “The Laugh of the Medusa.”  Cixous appropriates, within the context of phallic 
privilege, Derrida’s concept of a linguistic social structure dependent upon binary opposition.  
She specifies woman as the negative within a binary language build on male versus female, and 
therefore conceives of woman as Other, being defined in terms of what the dominant male lacks.  
A particularly Derridean assertion in Cixous’s introduction—and an indication of Chuck 
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Palahniuk’s attitude toward the binary construction of the modern Gothic monster—is her 
description of woman’s relationship toward history: 
The future must no longer be determined by the past.  I do not deny that the effects of the 
past are still with us.  But I refuse to strengthen them by repeating them, to confer upon 
them an irremovability the equivalent of destiny, to confuse the biological and the 
cultural.  Anticipation is imperative. (Cixous 875) 
Here, Cixous is referring to woman’s historical position within Western society, her emphasis 
being the need for a new writing uninfluenced by a history fraught with phallogocentric 
discourse. Although concerning woman in the case of Cixous, this attitude mirrors that of 
Palahniuk toward the position of the Gothic monster within literary tradition.  Palahniuk 
similarly attempts not to sever the ties between modern Gothicism and postmodern Gothic 
fiction but rather to re-think the monster within a context free of binary dependence.  Therefore, 
he does not abandon Gothic tropes entirely, but rather he incorporates and transforms these 
elements in a radically new way.  
Additionally, Cixous’s examination of the relationship between observer and Other 
reflects an attitude that Palahniuk adopts in his subversive positioning of reader and protagonist 
Cixous is reflecting upon the fear associated with the subordinate entity within a binary 
relationship and the primitive acceptance of this reaction by society.  Describing the 
marginalized figure in Western society, she asserts: 
As soon as they begin to speak, at the same time as they’re taught their name, they can be 
taught that their territory is black [. . .] your continent is dark.  Dark is dangerous.  You 
can’t see anything in the dark, you’re afraid.  Don’t move, you might fall.  Most of all, 
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don’t go into the forest.  And so we have internalized this horror of the dark. (Cixous 
877-8) 
Palahniuk’s characters actively seek to subvert this fear of the dark into a desire for the unknown 
territory, and by implicating readers in the emotions/actions of his protagonist, Palahniuk 
effectively subverts this fear for readers, as well.  This subversion allows Palahniuk to dissolve 
the binary system of thought in such a way that, by aligning reader with monster, results in an 
internal dissolution of morals, values, and judgments based upon this oppositional system.  As 
Cixous claims for the woman within such a system, the process of dissolution “is already upon 
us—in the United States, for example, where millions of night crawlers are in the process of 
undermining the family and disintegrating the whole of American sociality” (883).  Furthermore, 
as works such as Ellis’s American Psycho and Palahniuk’s Invisible Monsters exemplify, a 

















Section III: Demarginalization in Palahniuk’s Fiction: What Scholars are (not) Saying 
 
Alongside other French feminists, Rosi Braidotti asserts woman’s confinement to the 
territory labeled irrational in terms of patriarchal thought.  Therefore, she demands a redefinition 
of the relationship between human subjectivity and difference, specifically constructions of 
Otherness.  Furthermore, this redefinition of relationship demands a redefinition of discourse.  
She asserts that “academics will have to agree that thinking adequately about our historical 
condition implies the transcendence of disciplinary boundaries and intellectual categories” (77).  
Within a fictional context, writer Chuck Palahniuk adopts this position while reconfiguring the 
Gothic monster. He most effectively liberates the monster from a category of Otherness within 
his 1999 novel Invisible Monsters, a work in which he radically transforms reader/monster 
relationship in order to achieve this effect.  Furthermore, he combines elements of the Gothic 
genre with those of a deconstructionist influence, effectively “transcending [the] disciplinary and 
intellectual categories” specified by Braidotti (77).   
However, despite Palahniuk’s sociological attention to the fictional monster, there is 
minimal scholarly attention that specifically addresses this focus.  Furthermore, there is no 
current discussion of his pre-Socratic influence, particularly that of flux, which allows him to 
dislocate monstrosity as an Othered category.  While few scholars do, indeed, address separately 
his employment of the Gothic genre and his deconstructionist attitude within Invisible Monsters, 
this criticism does not directly explore the relationship of these two approaches within the 
context of social marginalization.  
In his article “On Mutilation: The Sublime Body of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fiction,” Andrew 
Slade hints at an intersection between Palahniuk’s deconstructionist attitude and the sociological 
motivation that underlies his portrayal of the sublime.  Associating Palahniuk’s fiction with the 
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theme of survival, he asserts that Palahniuk’s protagonists must struggle to overcome the 
oppressiveness of American culture, which is “sick” (Slade 63).  Furthermore, he identifies the 
source of such oppression to be consumerist culture and the power of escape to exist in bodily 
mutilation: 
In a world where the difference between the fake and the authentic can barely be 
discerned or sustained, only the most violent negations of appearances, mutilations, can 
give us something we can believe in, a new authenticity. The sublime figure of the 
mutilated body redeems the authenticity of the world. (72) 
Although Slade’s assertion that self-mutilation provides authenticity and escape from societal 
oppression seems to be a plausible explanation for Palahniuk’s liberation of the Other, it merely 
re-establishes a system of oppressive binaries.  If the self-mutilated body becomes the new center 
for monster discourse, then that which lies without the center, i.e. the non-mutilated and the 
beautiful, merely takes the place of the Other.  Furthermore, Palahniuk’s protagonist expresses 
directly the insufficiency of her self-mutilation for providing such escape from discourse.  Not 
only did “the little paper tiger attempts to reject looking good [sin] only end up reinforcing it,” 
but also does her more radical attempt prove insufficient. “The truth is, being ugly isn’t the thrill 
you’d think,” she admits (287).  However, recognizing by the end of the novel her ability to 
recreate herself endlessly, she expresses an optimism afforded by such infinite play—“it can be 
an opportunity for something better than I ever imagined” (288).  Therefore, Palahniuk 
ultimately celebrates the infinite play afforded within a fictional context based on impermanence 
of identity, as indicated by his protagonist’s final words.  This optimistic tone, however, is 
commonly ignored by Palahniuk’s critics, as indicated by Slade among others. 
Blair 21 
 
Andrew Ng similarly addresses bodily mutilation as a means of escape from 
commodification by the culture industry, yet his tone is more optimistic than that of Slade. He 
explains that “merely material, the subject [within a capitalist system] is [sin] categorized in 
terms of how he ‘matters’ to the culture industry that prescribes value to him,” (Ng 25).  
Therefore, acknowledging this association between body (“a socio-ideological construction”) 
and experience, Palahniuk’s characters seek gender reconfiguration and self-mutilation as a 
means of destroying their culture-prescribed value/experience and “relocate[ing] experience back 
within themselves” (Ng 26).  Self-destruction, then, becomes an essential means of achieving 
authenticity in a postmodern, capitalist society.  Similar to that of Andrew Slade, Ng’s attribution 
of monstrosity to characters that transform the body in order to escape capitalist discourse is 
centered on a claim of becoming/turning monster, and achieving authenticity.  
While Palahniuk, indeed, utilizes flux as a necessary feature of identity formation for 
protagonist and reader alike, he does not assert flux as a means of achieving some state deemed 
monstrous.  He might, like Ng suggests, seek physical transformation as a medium of flux in the 
novel due to its Foucaultian association with a locus of experience, hence its connotation as a 
dynamic process through which a sense of self constantly may be destroyed, renewed, or 
reshaped.  However, Palahniuk denies monstrosity and authenticity alike as states of being and, 
hence, possibilities both literarily and socially.  Ng’s assertion of this state of being monstrous 
reinforces the dichotomous thinking that Palahniuk attacks, for it assumes an idealism and a 
hierarchy of existence. Ng’s strategy for discerning monstrosity as a reclamation of the body, 
hence a reclamation of experience, is self-contradictory in its attribution of becoming alongside 
being, for it employs dualism (not-being/being) while claiming to promote pluralism.  This 
pluralism is a necessary tool for Palahniuk’s undermining of monster-as-Other, and it similarly is 
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pertinent to the situation of woman as Other. Ng even draws this parallel himself, quoting 
Braidotti: 
At times of fast-changing social and cultural conditions, the mutant, hybrid, monstrous 
others accelerate to an almost vertiginous degree the destabilization of the subject.  They 
both express and enhance the subject’s confrontation with the pain of transition and 
transformation.  They stress the inevitability of negotiations, shifts, and restructuring that 
lie at the heart of the process of change and how they imply both pain and exhilaration 
and can never avoid conflict. (Braidotti qtd. in Ng 32) 
Ng perceives the element of transformation underlying the monstrosity within Invisible 
Monsters, yet he exercises a teleological perspective, as well.  That is, in holding that 
Palahniuk’s characters “embody monstrosities—the ugly freak and the terrible woman,” he 
implies that monstrosity is the end-product of a bodily transformative process (Ng 33). As 
reinforced by the end of Invisible Monsters, however, Palahniuk implies that monstrosity is an 
ongoing engagement with self and identity, seemingly endless to his protagonist Shannon, as she 
realizes at the end of the novel.  In this way, Palahniuk maneuvers a step beyond the 
deconstruction to which the few critics of Invisible Monsters hold him accountable.  This more 
radically deconstructive approach effectively allows him to re-interpret monstrosity as an 
intrinsic, necessary, and inescapable part of human existence.   
While Slade and Ng assert the body as a locus for monstrosity in Palahniuk’s Invisible 
Monsters, other critics locate this monstrosity in the intellect. These scholars address Palahniuk’s 
implication of reader into the position of the Other figure as a means of questioning, devaluing, 
or affirming moral and societal codes/values.  Their critiques contend that Palahniuk’s 
subversive technique delves beyond literary voyeurism and into an abyss of self-exploration, 
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potential guilt, anxiety, and excitement for readers; furthermore, readers might utilize their 
shared emotional experience with protagonist as a means to challenge or affirm their own beliefs, 
values, etc.  Shannon, in this instance, serves as a third party through whose lens readers might 
examine their own instable identities.  This self-reflection via the lens of a character deemed 
monster is made possible via the hybridity that Palahniuk attributes to his narrator.  The ability of 
readers to empathize with a character who attempts to cope with her own anxieties regarding her 
ever-changing identity and conceptions of the world not only contributes to a “mental 
playground” effect with which readers might explore their current convictions while forming 
new sets of values/standards for monstrosity but also produces an almost narcissistic satisfaction 
for readers of monstrous texts.  This narcissism is a consequence of readers’ discovery that, in 
reading about characters that openly confess their violent, sometimes perverse, urges while 
maintaining a certain normality through their relatable confessions, readers simultaneously are 
able to explore repressed reflections of themselves.  Interestingly, in the case of Palahniuk, this 
narcissism of reader is another implication of the reader into the role of the protagonist—while 
the monstrous protagonist engages in a process of self-watching, so does the reader engage in a 
process of introspection and self-recognition that is necessary for his/her own continued 
pleasure. 
A theory that best explains this process is offered by Otto Rank, who originates the 
notion of a double/shadow/reflection, essentially an alter ego.  Rank observes that this reflection, 
though almost universally the focal point for a number of superstitions regarding bad luck and 
death (as seen in the modern Gothic), seems to be “at its origin an attempt to find comfort, to 
ameliorate our fear of the inevitable extinction that awaits us all.  The shadow is evidence of an 
incorporeal self, a self that exists apart from the physical body that invariably meets with death” 
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(Rank 12).  Furthermore, Milica Zivkovic describes the double as a figure which “pursues the 
subject as his second self and makes him feel as himself and the other at the same time,” a factor 
which, when applied to Invisible Monsters, might help explain the protagonist’s dependence on 
reader response as a means of narrative development (Zivkovic 122).  While readers, at surface, 
might feel as though they are exploring the psychological quandaries of figures whose moral 
standards/internality contrast starkly with their own moral standards (i.e. “sparring” with the 
Other), the power which these figures exert over readers lies precisely in this ability to seem 
contradictory to readers.   
Therefore, the value of the double, according to Zivkovic, “reside[s] in its resistance to 
definition, in its ‘escapist’ qualities, [and] in the possibility it offers to the individual to imagine 
himself and reproduce himself in endless ways” (122).  In conjunction with the aforementioned 
concept of a mental playground wherein readers might reconstruct their own values and/or 
identity through the lenses of hybrid literary monsters, the notion of a doppelgänger— in the 
context of Invisible Monsters as opposed to traditional Gothic texts that pose these figures 
against readers—further allows readers to explore the confines of labeled existence as well as the 
escapist qualities of characters who attempt to break those confines within realistic settings.   
Critic Jesse Kavadlo maintains that Palahniuk’s transgressive fiction achieves its own self-
de(con)struction, “the ironic sense that the reader’s cultural views by the end of the novel should 
be precisely the opposite of the views expressed by the narrator at the beginning” (Kavadlo qtd. 
in Sondergard).   
 Contributing to this paradox is the narrative strategy employed by Palahniuk.  In “Chuck 
Palahniuk and the Semiotics of Personal Doom,” Sidney Sondergard analyzes this strategy.  She 
asserts that he “delivers deeply flawed characters to his readers, then immerses his charismatic 
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losesr in crises that superficially seem to reinforce their shortcomings before pushing them to the 
point of a Kierkegaardian, change-or-die decision” (15).  Prefacing her analysis of Palahniuk’s 
use of a “semiotics of escalating anxiety” as a means of transposing readers into the emotions of 
the protagonist, Sondergard compares his approach to that of Antonin Artaud, whose Theatre of 
Cruelty exposes audience members to disconcerting subject matter.  While Sondergard does not 
explicitly contribute this appeal to visceral impact to the Gothic tradition, she does recognize 
Palahniuk’s unique blending of emotionality with intellectual engagement.  She asserts that 
“reading Palahniuk’s novels become the real world correlative of encountering the Nightmare 
Box, art-as-trap: ‘What’s inside the box is some fact you can’t unlearn.  Some new ideas you 
can’t undiscover’” (9).  Here, Sondergard is referencing Palahniuk’s novel Haunted, but 
Palahniuk similarly imposes protagonist emotions alongside intellectual discovery on readers of 
Invisible Monsters, specifically pertaining to identity as well as gender identity.   
Shannon McFarland, the novel’s narrator, admits to employing this very technique when 
revealing the former identity of Seth Thomas, a roadie companion whom, until this point of 
revelation, readers have assumed to be a love interest of Brandy Alexander and an object of 
Shannon’s jealousy—this jealousy has been supplemented by Shannon’s slipping of estrogenic 
hormones into Seth’s drinks.  However, Shannon reveals that Seth had, during her modeling 
days, been her deceitful fiancé: 
I couldn’t tell you this until now because I want you to know how discovering this felt.  
In my heart.  My fiancé wanted to kill me.  Even when he’s that much an asshole, I loved 
Manus.  I still love Seth.  A knife, it felt like a knife, and I’d discovered that despite 




Not only does Palahniuk reverse the concept of situational irony in this instance, imposing on 
readers a shocking truth that has influenced the narrative until this point (and only at the 
discretion of the protagonist), but also does he cleverly manipulate direct address. Readers 
acquire an empathy for Shannon, a “monster” who is capable of complex human emotions and 
subject to the adverse consequences of a “normal” life. Palahniuk humanizes his monster, so to 
speak, and this is a clever strategy for renewing a shock value to future deeds committed by his 
now hybrid monster.  
   Sondergard recognizes this motif of self-denying narrative in other works of Palahniuk, 
and she claims it is necessary in order that his narrators achieve the illusion of authenticity and, 
hence, “escape succumbing to unconscious self-entrapment” that would exclude readers from 
emotional and intellectual participation in their narratives (10).  However, a factor that she does 
not consider is Palahniuk’s subtle deconstruction both of identity as a stable, unchanging entity 
(i.e. in a Platonic sense) and of the reality/appearance distinction.  By providing readers with an 
explanation for their own response and consequent re-evaluation of the events of Shannon’s 
narrative in light of this new information, Palahniuk simultaneously instills in readers a 
skepticism for the narrative, therefore subtly undermining an opposition between reality versus 
appearance.  
  







Section IV: “Some Place to be that’s not on the Map”: Implacable Monstrosity in Invisible 
Monsters 
 
‘I’m not straight, and I’m not gay,’ she says.  ‘I’m not bisexual. I want out of the labels.  I don’t 
want my whole life crammed into a single word.  A story.  I want to find something else, 
unknowable, some place to be that’s not on the map.  A real adventure.’—Brandy, Invisible 
Monsters 
In contrast with Bret Easton Ellis, whose deconstructive attitude toward literary 
monstrosity hinges on a universalization of the category (it lies dormant in all of us), Palahniuk 
denies the ontological possibility of this category. Palahniuk’s more extreme remedy to the 
problem of a dichotomous monster/reader, object/subject relationship is an absolute skepticism 
pertaining truth/reality.  He adopts the ontological skepticism of Cratylus, who asserts that 
“reality is utterly particular.  Any adequate thought would have to match the flux with change of 
its own, so any attempt to categori[z]e reality is really like trying to cage the winds” (Blackburn). 
Whereas Cratylus’s acknowledgement of this flux pertaining language leads him to a nihilistic 
abandonment of speech altogether as a means of communication, Palahniuk’s transposition of 
this perspective into an oppressive discourse is celebratory, as mentioned previously.  Rather 
than project sociocultural and psychological anxiety upon a physical entity, Palahniuk disables 
this projection within a constantly changing world—as the title of this section suggests, 
Palahniuk’s monstrosity is physically implacable. 
Palahniuk utilizes Gothic elements in Invisible Monsters as a means of advancing this 
notion of a physically implacable monstrosity.  He both satirizes Gothic tropes and utilizes them 
to reveal their own contradictory natures.  In this way, he achieves a self-cognizance that allows 
him effectively to disrupt internally a system of oppression within the Gothic genre.  His 
employment of radical flux pertaining performance, identity, and story/myth enables him to 
create a region of Derridean difference in which signifier (subject) consistently replaces signified 
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(object, monster, Other), and vice versa; the liberating effect of this infinite play is described by 
scholar David Bentley Hart: 
The realm of difference is a region of freedom, chance, peril, escape, play, desire, 
absence, and innumerable paths of departure; it is the open horizon of becoming in its 
innocence, the homeland and the exile of the sign where an infinite array of signifiers 
[sin] excite and provoke one another into endless gaming; it is the land of unlikeness 
liberated at last from an ancient empire and rejoicing in itself. (53). 
Palahniuk transforms the Gothic elements of watching/gazing, story/myth, and double identity in 
a way that, unlike his Gothic predecessors or contemporaries, allows him to unleash the monster 
from a territory of social confinement. 
He incorporates the element of watching/self-watching in a repetitive way, both 
chronologically and schematically, throughout Invisible Monsters. Not only does his narrator 
Shannon directly assert reality as a tedious cycle of performance consisting of a necessary (and, 
indeed, narcissistic) self-watching and a simultaneous gazing, but also does Palahniuk subvert 
his protagonist, and subsequently readers, into this cycle.  The effect of this protagonist and 
reader subversion is a denial of a stable vantage point with which to specify an Othered figure.  
As protagonist and readers recognize their impermanent positions in which their subjective roles 
infinitely are replaced by those of object, and vice versa, so, too, do they realize the liberation 
that this instability offers.   
  “It’s eerie, but what’s happening is the folks are staring at themselves in the monitor 
staring at themselves in the monitor staring at themselves in the monitor, on and on, completely 
trapped in a reality loop that never ends,” (Palahniuk 118).  Browsing the cable television, 
Shannon, too, is trapped in a reality loop that never ends.  She cannot find a show that is 
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anything but reality television—“Cristy Drank Human Blood,” “Roger Lived with Dead 
Mother,” and “Brenda Ate Her Baby” are a few of these shows that, essentially, emphasize the 
exact labeled existence that Shannon seeks to escape (116).  Recognizing her identification with 
these reality TV stars, she deems herself “Bubba-Joan GotHerJawShotOff” (120).  Emphasizing 
Shannon’s implication in the unavoidable “reality loop,” one channel even features Shannon 
during her prior modeling career.  The commercial itself consists of a cyclic watching and self-
watching—“the studio audience all looks off in another direction, watching themselves watch 
themselves watch themselves watch Manus smile [sin] at Evie” (119).  Perhaps more eerie 
however, is Shannon’s own narcissistic gazing at her persona in the commercial, a persona who 
not only is watching herself on the monitor, but also is being watched by an audience.  “About a 
hundred times I watched it, but I was only watching myself.  That reality loop thing [. . .] And, 
jeez, I’m beautiful” she admits (120).   
Andy Johnson describes this narcissism in terms of a visual cannibalism in which the 
eyes visually consume projected images of their own bodily manifestation.  He infers that “the 
consumer is never supposed to be a finished product, but is seduced into endlessly looking in the 
mirror and attempting to adjust his/her body to reach an unattainable ideal,” (Johnson 64).  
Though Johnson explores the implications of this visual cannibalism in the context of 
consumerism, inferring the infinite nature of this manipulation of image, Palahniuk also utilizes 
this technique to disrupt reader subjectivity (watching) as well as protagonist objectivity (being 
watched).  Within this cycle of exchange between subject and object, there lacks the ability for a 
permanently Othered figure and an original form by which to measure conformity or deviation. 
This technique is similar to Beckett’s blurring of Derrida’s visor effect in Ill Seen Ill Said; 
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however, rather than appeal to subject/object ambiguity, Palahniuk implements a repetitive 
exchange of position.    
This reader implication in a cyclic watching/self-watching is extended by Palahniuk 
during Shannon’s flashbacks to Brumbach’s Department Store prior to her self-mutilation.  She 
and her friend/fellow model Evie would stage partially truthful and partially hyperbolic 
tragicomedies on furniture sets in the store, entertaining audiences of department store shoppers 
while gaining both a narcissistic satisfaction and a sense of authenticity from their being 
watched: “Every afternoon, Evie and me, we’d star in our own personal unnatural habitat.  The 
clerks would sneak off to find sex in the men’s room.  We’d all soak up attention in our own 
little matinee life [. . .] I hate how I don’t feel real enough unless people are watching” (69-70). 
As Shannon and Evie gain self-affirmation and narcissistic pleasure in recounting these episodes, 
so do readers, who find humor and even empathy during these emotionally heightened 
performances.  This empathy might be a result of the agency afforded Shannon and Evie, who 
yearn to create and/or enhance their own stories and establish themselves as agents independent 
of the circumstances imposed upon them by reality.  Readers experience humor not as an 
instinctual response to the uncomfortable or unfamiliar nature of Shannon’s and Evie’s 
performances, but rather as a direct result of the matter-of-fact attitude with which the actresses 
disclose disturbing information to their seemingly naïve department store audiences: “‘You had a 
mutilated brother?’ she’d say [. . .] ‘Yeah, he was pretty mutilated, but not in a sexy way.  Still, 
there’s a happy ending,’ I’d say. ‘He’s dead now’” (73).  This emotional implication of reader 
mirrors the narrative implication that typifies Shannon’s re-telling of her performances via 
flashbacks.  As Shannon gazes at her previous self, a self that seeks escape from confinement to 
a conforming story, readers, who reflect on their empathetic relationship with Shannon during 
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these performances, engage in a process of self-watching as they question their socially taboo 
empathy during these socially deviant performances.   
In his chronological repetition of this combination of watching and self-watching, 
Palahniuk emphasizes this process as being necessary to identity formation as opposed to being 
characteristic of a particular monstrosity.  Even after Shannon’s self-mutilation, she expresses a 
desire for being watched and, through narration, for re-telling (effectively, watching) her 
experience as object.  Reflecting on a visit to the Space Needle during which she and her fellow 
outcasts are dancing in an elevator to imagined technological music of the future, she 
acknowledges: “This guy looks at us as if we’re those puppies you see behind glass in suburban 
mall pet stores.  Like we’re those puppies with yellow ooze on their eyes and buttholes [. . .] the 
future is just wasted on some people” (Palahniuk 100).  While Shannon seemingly expresses 
dismay at the reaction of the elevator boy, readers interpret her reaction as merely another 
performance.  Being well informed from other instances in the novel of Shannon’s explicit desire 
for attention, readers dismiss her apparent dismay and, instead, interpret her account as yet 
another narcissistic and necessary reflection on her transgressive behavior.  The extent of this 
desire is revealed by her attitude toward her self-mutilation when she comments, “sometimes 
being mutilated can work to your advantage.  All those people now with piercings and tattoos 
and brandings and scarification [. . .] What I mean is, attention is attention” (53).  Although, in 
this need for a watching eye, Palahniuk seems to uphold the subject/object relationship necessary 
for a category of monstrosity, he instead dismantles this opposition by attributing to Shannon a 
desire for such watching as well as a self-watching.  Insomuch as she preys upon the attention as 
a source of self-affirmation, she resists objectification by a subject. Furthermore, reader 
subjectivity is dismantled as a direct consequence of implication in the reality loop of self-
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watching.  The effect of this implication in performance is the advancement of Palahniuk’s 
theme involving a lack of a stable reality in Invisible Monsters against which to judge the actions 
of his protagonist as real or imagined.  This instability is imposed on readers in such a way that 
not only denies them this possibility but also affirms their own compliance with Shannon’s 
socially transgressive behavior, therefore contributing a narcissism that further implicates them 
in the role of the protagonist.   
 Another significant technique that Palahniuk employs as a means of expressing an 
absolute skepticism toward the category of monstrosity is his deconstruction of story/myth.  
Utilized within the traditional Gothic to achieve the opposite effect, myth functions in Invisible 
Monsters as a denial of a definitive basis for identity construction.  Shannon’s companion 
Brandy Alexander, a source of inspiration, transformation, obsession, and loathing for Shannon, 
serves as an explicit proponent of this skepticism.  The skeptical attitude expressed in her 
following words capture the narrative strategy employed by Palahniuk: “When you understand 
[sin] that what you’re telling is just a story.  It isn’t happening anymore.  When you realize the 
story you’re telling is just words, when you can just crumble it up and throw your past in the 
trashcan, [sin] then we’ll figure out who you’re going to be” (61).   
Not only is the episodic narrative structure of Invisible Monsters indicative of this 
destruction of linearity between past and present, but also is character development (or lack 
thereof) representative.  Character development is impossible in a narrative structure that is in 
constant flux, “flashing” from one episode to the next in a jigsaw puzzle-like expression of 
events.  The result of this lack of progressive development allows Palahniuk and narrator alike an 
expressive freedom with which they might continually become but never permanently be.  Once 
again, readers are denied a subjectivity that otherwise might be afforded by a linear narrative 
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within which to compare/contrast actions or character traits from different points in time. Brandy 
serves as an authorial voice for Palahniuk’s attitude regarding the matter, asserting that “people 
are all over the world telling their one dramatic story and how their life has turned into getting 
over this one event.  Now their lives are more about the past than their future” (117).  By 
contrast, Palahniuk’s characters are provided multiple stories that function as springboards into 
subsequent stories rather than function as constituent pieces of an over-arching narrative with a 
teleological theme throughout.  If one does assert a theme, this theme is one of impermanence. 
Palahniuk hyperbolizes the detachment of each story by recreating personas for his 
characters, a move that is reminiscent of identity doubling within the modern Gothic.  What 
differentiates this phenomenon within Invisible Monsters, however, is the unending range of 
identities that are performed by the characters.  In one story, Brandy assigns Shannon the role of 
“lost heiress to the House of St. Patience”: “‘You come from escaped French aristocrat blood [. . 
.] You grew up in Paris, and went to a school run by nuns,’” Brandy explains (Palahniuk 107).  
In another story, Shannon holds her former fiancé Manus (later discovered to be Seth) hostage 
after he attempts to murder her during the night. Even by the end of Palahniuk’s work, his 
protagonist expresses the need for a new story, one that is not dictated by Brandy but rather 
grants her agency: “What I need to learn to do for myself.  To write my own story” (296).    
Although, upon reflection of the events in Invisible Monsters, one might arrange them in 
a way that enables the rationalization of an over-arching narrative, their presentation during the 
reading process denies this rationalization.  While reading Palahniuk’s collage of narratives, 
readers perceive only a theme built on constant change, contradiction, and unexpected character 
actions.  Shannon expresses her own apprehension of a constantly mutating “story”: “[. . .] a new 
identity.  A new name.  New relationships.  Handicaps.  It’s hard to remember who I started this 
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road trip being” (64).  Even upon closer reading of the work, readers find it difficult to arrange 
the various stories into a linear narrative.  Perhaps it is more enigmatic, however, that readers do 
not desire to rationalize Invisible Monsters, for this rationalization would detract from their 
emotional appreciation of the novel as well as force them to place their seemingly escapist 
narrator into the system of order from which she seeks confinement.   
However hopeful readers might be pertaining Shannon’s escape, however, the concept 
that allows for her rearrangement of stories, identities, and vantage point also binds her.  That is, 
the infinite play of signifiers and signified within Shannon’s realm of difference provides no 
escape, but rather the infinite possibility for her to create a new story. While this lack of escape 
might seem pessimistic on behalf of Palahniuk, he instead celebrates this territory in which social 
categorization is inconsistent with a lack of permanence: “There isn’t any real you in 
you…Nothing of you is all-the-way yours [sin] Relax [. . .] You’re safe because you’re so 
trapped inside your culture…The world is your cradle and your trap” (Palahniuk 218-9).  
Insomuch as Shannon’s world is one of becoming and never authentically being, the possibility 
of her Otherness is impossible.  Just like the other “invisible monsters” in Palahniuk’s work, she 
is merely “a product of a product of a product,” and this lack of stable identity frees her from an 
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